Ten shocking conspiracy theories that were completely Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. This volume deals only with the former. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. . Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance He is the author of. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. "4 This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. The first reports of the encounter from the destroyers reached the White House at 1000 EDT. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. 2. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. The Taliban silenced him. Gulf Of Tonkin Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. The stage was set. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). IV-2 to IV-4. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." ThoughtCo. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. 5. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. Fluoride. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. Hickman, Kennedy. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam.
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